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It is a truism in policymaking that everything is related to every-
thing else so that, in one sense, all interrelationships and subsequent
effects should be taken into account before decisions are made ....
In the real world of time pressures and staff specialization, the in-
ternal links within a policy area are typically explored in great detail
.... But another level, the interconnections between policy areas
.... is often overlooked.1
Fundamental "modes of thought" (Denkarten) or "styles of think-
ing" can be at least as important as ideas or ideologies in shaping the
law.2 This theory has been pointed out by the distinguished German legal
scholar Wolfgang Fikentscher5 Today, American environmental law is
groping toward a new "style of thinking," as many of the articles in this
symposium illustrate.
The need for new ways of looking at environmental law was brought
to the forefront a year ago. In a remarkable article, Professor Joseph L.
Sax documented the increasing malaise and undercurrent of dissatisfac-
tion with the intellectual underpinnings of environmental law that most
* Assistant Administrator and General Counsel, United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency; Professor of Law, Yale Law School (on leave of absence). B.A. Yale College,
J.D. Yale Law School. The views expressed in this introduction are the personal opinions of
the author and do not represent those of the EPA, the United States government or any
other organization or group.
1. G. SCHULTZ & K. DAM, ECONOMIC POLICY BEYOND THE HEADLINES 7 (1977).
2. W. Fikentsher, Modes of Thought in Law and Justice: A Preliminary Report on a
Study in Legal Anthropology (IV. Wueliner ed. 1988) (available at The University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley Center for Hermeneutical Studies).
3. Id.
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academic practitioners feel.4 Professor Sax, of Boalt Hall Law School at
the University of California at Berkeley, is one of the academic founders
of environmental law.5 Sax surveyed every listed instructor of environ-
mental law in the United States and concluded that most professors are
"discouraged": "Bewilderment and frustration were the most common
themes."' The problem is not merely the growing complexity and detail
of environmental statutes and regulations. Instead, according to Sax,
"[w]hat discourages law teachers is rather a sense of being drawn into a




Underlying Sax's complaint is the same phenomenon that provides
the occasion for this symposium. It is becoming increasingly clear that we
have reached the limits of our current "styles of thought" for analyzing
enviionmental law problems. This article will first describe the character-
istics of the current prevailing mode of thinking about environmental law
which is termed "goal analysis."" Next, this article explains why goal
analysis has reached its limits and now must be transcended. Finally, this
article begins to describe the character of a new style of thinking about
environmental problems. Several of the articles in this symposium reflect
this emerging style, the "ecological approach" to environmental problems.
I. GoAL ANALYsis AND ITS LIMITS
To understand the current prevailing paradigm of goal analysis and
its limits, some background knowledge is necessary. The problem with
which environmental law concerns itself is not new.9 For centuries prop-
erty, torts, and nuisance law have struggled with situations in which one
person's activities adversely affect his neighbors.10 To be sure, modern
technologies of measurement have made visible many new situations11 in
which the ancient tragedy of the commons12 is played out. However, the
model problem with which environmental law concerns itself-the effect
of resource externalities on the community (including future genera-
4. See generally Sax, Environmental Law in the Law School: What We Teach and
How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10251 (1989).
5. See Most Environmental Law Leaders Shaped Field, Nat'I L.J., July 23, 1990, at
25-26.
6. Sax, supra note 4, at 10251.
7. Id.
8. See generally Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Com-
pensation Systems, 73 GEo. L.J. 1357 (1985).
9. The first smoke control ordinances in England date from about 1300. See generally
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (7th ed. 1956).
10. See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611) (suit for "unhealthy
odors" emanating from hogsty next door).
11. For an account of the role of technologies of measurement in prompting govern-
ment action to deal with environmental problems, see generally Elliott, Ackerman & Mil-
lian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law,
1 J. L., EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985).




What distinguishes environmental law from its common law precur-
sors is not the nature of the problems addressed, but rather a changed
conception of the role of law and the state in addressing these problems.
As Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained, traditionally, the common
law was reactive. The law concerned itself with evaluating individual
transactions retrospectively in terms of conventional moral norms. 14
Thus, traditionally, nuisance law asked not whether the benefits of con-
trolling pollution exceeded the costs, but whether an individual's actions
were "reasonable" when measured against the conduct of others engaged
in similar activities.
5
Environmental law approaches problems involving externalities in
the use of resources from the changed jurisprudential perspective charac-
teristic of what Professor Ackerman calls the "activist state."' 6 The role
of law in the activist state is not merely to apply conventional moral
norms. Rather, the law's role in this vision is to use the power of the state
prospectively as an instrument for transforming specified aspects of the
world. This transformation will allow society to achieve the goals it has
set for itself."
To date, this vision of environmental law as an instrument to achieve
desired social objectives has been implemented through a mode of
thought termed "goal analysis."18 Viewed as a style of thinking, goal anal-
ysis posits an isolated, free-standing goal for law to achieve. This goal is
usually defined in terms of a single scale (maintenance of air quality stan-
dards which protect the public health). 9 The goal is implicitly modelled
as a dependent variable that can be manipulated by changing indepen-
dent variables (legal incentives). Thus, underlying goal analysis is a sim-
ple model of causal connections between inputs and outputs, between
laws and behavior.20
13. For a fascinating study of how 18th century Japan dealt with these problems, see
Totman, The Forests of Tokugawa Japan, 18 TRANS. ASIATIC Soc. JAPAN 3D 1 (1983). See
generally C. TOTMAN, THE GREEN ARCHAPELIGO: FoREsTRY IN PRE-INDuSTmIAL JAPAN (1989).
14. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 38-39 (1984).
15. Ackerman's idealized model of the common law as "reactive" is accurate, if at all,
only with regard to traditional common law subjects. Under the new style of "activist"
thinking, it has also been applied by judges in common law subjects. Cf. Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1304-16 (1976) (describing
new roles for judges). Indeed, one way to conceptualize "the problem" in modem tort law is
that judges are applying "activist state" thinking in institutional settings that are not well-
suited to this type of analysis. Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic
Compensation Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1366-67 (1985). Thus, the modern nuisance stan-
dard converges with the way environmental law would approach the problem.
16. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 1-5.
17. The view of law as active, as opposed to reactive, can be related to "conservative"
as well as liberal goals. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic Sys-
tem, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 10-12 (1984) (contrasting ex ante and ex post perspectives on legal
issues).
18. See generally Elliott, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1977).
20. Professor Robert Ellickson has observed that the conventional model of a direct
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More complex versions of goal analysis add side constraints (elimi-
nate adverse health effects to the extent economically and technically fea-
sible) or even instruct decisionmakers to optimize the joint product of
several factors (reduce pollution to the maximum extent technically feasi-
ble taking into account cost, energy, and other environmental effects). 1
This type of goal analysis dominates environmental law today, both in
the writing of statutes and in our thinking and writing about environmen-
tal law problems.
One should not unduly minimize the progress that has been achieved
through this type of one-dimensional, goal-oriented environmental law.
Even staunch critics of environmental law in the United States must ad-
mit that definite, measurable, albeit modest, progress has been made to-
ward achieving societal goals.22 However, as a style of thinking, goal
analysis also has definite limits. Many of the articles in this symposium
starkly illustrate those limits.
The world in which we live is much more complicated than is as-
sumed by the neat, one-dimensional models of inputs and outputs that
implicitly underlie goal analysis as a style of legal thinking. "The law of
unintended consequences" holds that interventions intended to affect one
variable in a complex system are likely to affect other elements of the
system in unforeseen and unintended ways. Most of the articles in this
symposium trace examples of how the "law of unintended consequences"
produces unforeseen secondary effects. These undesirable effects are
often the result of well-meaning interventions taken to achieve laudable
environmental goals.
Overarching the specific criticisms various articles in the symposium
make is a more fundamental point that goes to the heart of the problem:
The way current thinking approaches environmental law is too narrow.
As a result, regulatory interventions are prone to produce unintended and
undesirable secondary effects. Simplistically, goal analysis assumes direct
relationships between inputs and outputs, independent and dependent
variables, and legal incentives and desired behavior. 23 That is, the prevail-
ing paradigm of goal analysis is inherently flawed in that the "goals" are
artificially defined in abstract isolation. The goals are implemented with-
out regard to the dynamic relationships between goals and other desirable
social ends.
As a style of thinking, goal analysis is an adaptation of underlying
relationship between behavior and legal incentives is too simplistic. See generally Ellickson,
Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 623 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(1) (1978).
22. B. CONIMONEP, MAKING PEAcE WrrH THE PLANET 188-90 (1990). See generally Com-
moner, The Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 ENVTL. L. REv. 10195 (1988).
23. For a statement of the currently conventional view that internalizing costs of pol-
lution will result in predictable alterations in corporate behavior, see Babich, Understand-
ing the New Era in Environmental Law, 41 S.C.L. RE V. 733, 749-762 (1990). See also
Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666-83 (1971) (review of Dean Calabresi's
THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS).
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metaphors drawn from Newtonian physics and the scientific method as
described by Francis Bacon.2' These theories suggest focusing on varia-
tions in a single factor while holding other factors constant.25 These styles
of thinking are not wrong. They are powerful oversimplifications that can
be highly useful provided that they are applied to situations in which the
interactions among the elements of complex systems are of such small
importance that they may be disregarded as essentially nonexistent.
When a toy ball rolls down an inclined plane, not only does the
earth's gravity affect the ball, the ball also asserts a gravitational pull on
the earth. However, the force of the ball's gravity is so insignificant that it
can be disregarded. Therefore, we get into the habit of thinking that the
ball's gravity does not exist. Model causal connections also are viewed as
if they were direct relationships between independent and dependent
variables rather than dynamic interactions among interrelated elements.
The Newtonian/Baconian simplification works if, but only if, more com-
plex interactions among elements of the system are so trivial that they
may be disregarded.
Perhaps environmental law met this test of insignificance in the be-
ginning. As environmental law has become more and more significant,
however, the distorting "gravitational pull" which it exerts on economic
and social decisions is no longer insignificant. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (the EPA) economists estimate that this year in the United
States private and public sectors are spending more than $90 billion per
year (in 1986 dollars) for pollution control. By the year 2000, this cost will
grow to about $155 billion annually (also in 1986 dollars), or about 2.7%
of our total gross national product.26 According to some private econo-
mists, proposed initiatives to address possible changes in the global cli-
mate could add to this already impressive total of environmental
spending. Additional costs of $0.8 to $3.6 trillion could be incurred in
combatting the climate problem. In the United States, the direct costs
could be of the same magnitude as current defense spending. Losses of
annual output as high as $500 billion, or about 5% of national income, are
a distinct possibility.
2
Far from being trivial or insignificant, world-wide environmental law
may be the most ambitious attempt ever by human beings to use law to
shift resources and alter behavior.
24. For an exploration of how metaphors drawn from other disciplines affect legal
thinking, see Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM L. REv. 38
(1985).
25. See generally F. BACON, NovuM ORGANUM (T. Fowler trans. 1878).
26. Address by William K. Reilly, National Press Club meeting, "Aiming Before We
Shoot: The 'Quiet Revolution' in Environmental Policy" 6 (Sept. 26, 1990) (summarizing
results of the EPA's forthcoming Cost of Clean report).
27. Passell, Economic Watch: Staggering Cost is Foreseen to Curb Warming of Earth,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
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II. THE EMERGING NEW THINKING
In a provocative book, Robert Orstein and Paul Ehrlich argue that
nothing less than a fundamental transformation in the nature of human
thinking will be necessary if human beings are to take control of their
destinies and successfully manage their own evolution and the evolution
of their planet.2 s The essence of Orstein and Ehrlich's argument is that
the evolutionary heritage of humans has programmed into the species a
tendency to perceive and monitor sudden changes as single variables in
the environment. They argue that in order to effectively manage the
global environment, the human species must learn to perceive and think
in terms of subtle changes in the interactions of large systems.
By suggesting that the articles in this symposium exemplify an
emerging new style of thinking about environmental law, I do not mean
to suggest that a transformation is either currently complete or entirely
successful. The articles in this symposium illustrate an important first
step, but only a first step, by tracing undesirable and unintended second-
ary effects of environmental policies. Some articles move beyond mere
criticism to suggest ways to achieve goals without the identified negative
effects. The remaining challenge is taking the more fundamental step of
developing a general, theoretical approach to thinking about environmen-
tal problems that avoids the types of unforeseen consequences discussed
so eloquently in this symposium. The following observations may suggest
directions that could prove productive in pursuing that elusive goal.
As George Schultz and Kenneth Dam observed in the passage quoted
in the epigraph, in theory it might be desirable to trace all the secondary
effects of proposed policies before implementation. Following Professor
Mashaw, this ideal of comprehensive analysis is called the "synoptic ap-
proach."2 9 However attractive comprehensive analysis may be in theory,
in practice it remains impossible for any individual or organization to
think of every possible result before acting.30 Perhaps at some point in
the near future, computerized econometric models could make it much
more feasible to analyze the secondary incentive effects of major environ-
mental and other regulatory policies. Until these techniques are further
developed and refined, comprehensive, prospective analysis of the second-
ary incentive effects of regulatory policies remains a dream.
A simpler, more practical mode of pre-implementation analysis of
proposed policies is cost-benefit analysis. Comparing costs and benefits is
the staple of regulatory analysis conducted under the auspices of the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Man-
28. See R. ORSKuN & P. EHRLICH, NEW WORLD NEW MIND: MOVING TOWARD CONSCIOUS
EVOLUTION 189-204 (1989).
29. See generally Diver, Policy Making Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV,
L. REV. 303 (1981).
30. See generally H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (1976) (emphasizing limited capacity of both
individuals and organizations to process information).
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agement and Budget (OMB) under Executive Order 12,291. 31 Secondary
misallocations of resources resulting from unforeseen effects of regula-
tions are "costs" of regulatory programs. In theory, these costs ought to
be analyzed under Executive Order 12,291. For practical reasons relating
to the limits of currently available techniques, however, these secondary
costs are rarely identified or taken into account.
A more promising, albeit "rough and ready," approach to avoiding
unforeseen secondary effects of proposed environmental regulations
would rely on the method of heuristics rather than algorithms.3 2 Rather
than completely analyzing the effects of proposed policies, simpler "rules
of thumb" should be used to lead to policies for environmental regulation
less likely to result in undesirable and incomprehensible perturbations in
the behavior of complex economic and social systems.3 3 For reasons that
will become apparent, this approach to designing environmental policies
is called the "ecological approach."
Underlying an ecological approach to designing regulatory policies is
the theory of co-evolution. Co-evolution posits the theory that organisms
evolve together with their environments in mutually dynamic relation-
ships so that each is adapted to the other.34 This theory provides an in-
sight into the nature of the evolution of complex, interconnected systems
that is familiar to environmentalists in other contexts. For example, envi-
ronmentalists from Rachael Carson35 to Barry Commoner 36 have viewed
synthetic chemical pesticides with great suspicion. They prefer natural,
biological methods of pest control instead. One reason frequently cited
for such suspicion is that evolution has not had time to develop processes
for breaking down synthetic chemicals as opposed to naturally-occurring
substances. Whether this conclusion is justified or overstated may be sci-
31. See generally Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget
Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order
12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984). Unlike Olson, I am generally supportive of the
process prescribed by Executive Order 12,291. See generally Agency Autonomy and the
Unitary Executive, 68 WASHINGTON U.L.Q. 495 (1990) (panel discussion among Judge Ste-
phen Breyer, Prof. E. Donald Elliott, Judge Laurence Silberman, and former Justice De-
partment official Terry Eastland at Federalist Society Symposium entitled "The President
and Congress: Constitutionally Shared and Separated Powers," Washington, D.C., Jan. 19,
1990). I do agree with Olson that public disclosure and fair, regular procedures are essential
if the Office of Management and Budget's role in making policy is to be credible and
acceptable.
32. On the role of heuristics in simplifying analysis of complex problems, see Tversky
& Kahneman Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in D. KAHNEMAN, P.
SLOVIC & A. TVERSKY, JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, HEURISTICS AND BIASEs 3 (1982).
33. While the primary focus of this symposium is on environmental regulation effect
on the economic system, elsewhere I am exploring the effects that the design of environmen-
tal regulation may have on social values. E.D. Elliott, The Intellectual Foundations of Envi-
ronmental Law in the U.S.: From Law and Economics to Law and Biology? (Columbia Univ.
Law School Legal Theory Workshop, Working Paper, February 12, 1990).
34. For a summary of the insights of ecology, including an introduction to the theory
of co-evolution, see P. EHRLICH, THE MACHINERY OF NATURE 208-23 (1986).
35. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING 205-08 (1969).
36. B. COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 50-51 (1990).
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entifically debatable. 37 For present purposes, that is beside the point.
There is an underlying heuristic notion that natural systems are more
likely to be perturbed by the introduction of alien materials as opposed to
materials to which the systems are already adapted. This is undoubtedly
a sound rule of thumb.
The "ecological approach" to minimizing the undesirable secondary
effects of environmental regulation builds on this basic insight from the
ecology of natural systems. The approach then adapts this insight into
the realm of the economy and other social systems.38 The economic envi-
ronment in which corporate entities function is less likely to be unpre-
dictable in destabilizing ways if government intervenes using methods
with which economic entities are already familiar.
The "ecological approach" counsels strongly in favor of relying on
information and market-based economic incentives as methods of achiev-
ing environmental protection where possible.3 In contrast, the old style
command-and-control regulation often implemented outright bans of cer-
tain types of transactions or behaviors. The "corporate entities" which
are the subjects of this symposium are used to dealing with changes in
factor prices and new information coming into the marketplace. These are
regular features of the economic environments to which corporate entities
are adapted. Consequently, governmental interventions that take the
form of these economic changes are less likely to produce undesirable sec-
ondary consequences than the less subtle, more directive prohibitions of
command-and-control regulation.
There is already a strong and growing body of academic support for
the use of market-based systems as techniques for controlling pollution .4
However, to date this literature has focused primarily on the claim that
market-based systems can achieve levels of pollution control comparable
to those achieved by command-and-control systems at a reduced cost.41
37. See Ames, Magaw & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE
271, 276-77 (1987).
38. See generally H. SIMON, SCmNCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (1969) (promoting basic view
that "artificial systems" constructed by humans follow some of same principles of systems
theory as natural systems).
39. My own preference is for "hybrid" systems which combine market-based incen-
tives with standard-setting to insure that minimum health-based standards are not sacri-
ficed for economic considerations. Cf. S. KELMAN, WHAT PRIcE INCENTIVES 28-83 (1981); G.
CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES, 147-91 (1978) (describing ethical dilemmas raised
by putting a price on life and health).
40. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Providing Economic In-
centives in Environmental Regulation (Apr. 23, 1990); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming En-
vironmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171,
178-88 (1988).
41. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333, 1341 (1985); Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1985). The conventional conclusion that market-based ap-
proaches necessarily achieve lesser cost solutions has recently been questioned in an impor-
tant article. See Oates, Portney, & McGartland, The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based
Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting, 79 Am. ECON. REv. 1233,
1240-42 (1989). The argument by Oates and others relies heavily on the assumption that
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One author has even suggested that the limited information and limited
analytical capacity that is available to humans argues against market-
based systems. These systems are further alleged to be a kind of "fine-
tuning" of regulation.42 This article suggests that the opposite results
when the possibility of unforeseen consequences and secondary effects are
taken into account. To minimize unforeseen, undesirable secondary ef-
fects of environmental regulation, market-based methods should be used
whenever possible.
There is a strong and growing consensus that the next generation of
environmental protection will be about preventing pollution rather than
merely installing end-of-the-pipe technology to clean it up once it is gen-
erated.43 However, a critical debate is ongoing about whether the regula-
tory techniques used to prevent pollution will be the highly prescriptive
ones inherited from our command-and-control heritage, 4 4 or "kinder, gen-
tler" market-based incentives. The experience of the last decade has
shown repeatedly that stark legal interventions such as precluding partic-
ular types of transactions or behavior may have unforeseen and often un-
predictable effects. For example, banning one hazardous product may
actually increase environmental risks if the substitutes that replace it are
less safe.45 Alternatively, placing a tax or fee on particularly hazardous
materials will, over time, discourage its use with far less risk of disrupting
essential activities.
In the final analysis, the appeal of environmental protection is not
only technical, but also moral. In many ways, the environmental protec-
tion movement is the most ambitious movement ever to use law con-
sciously to redirect human behavior. The goal is to redesign human
activities so that they are more in tune with the fundamental order of
nature and can be carried out on a sustainable basis. That mission unde-
niably presents a very demanding challenge to both legal institutions and
legal thinking. Unless society develops new ways of thinking about envi-
ronmental protection, it cannot hope to achieve goals as ambitious as
those it has already set for itself.
command-and-control regimes will produce over-control that will result in net benefits. For
any level of control desired, however, an optimal mix of controls among sources can be
achieved in theory by either market-based or centralized command-and-control systems. In
practice, it is much more likely to be approximated by a decentralized system which relies
on markets rather than Soviet-style central planning. Stewart, supra note 41, at 21.
42. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Stan-
dards and "Fine Tuning" Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1314 (1985).
43. Compare Address by William K. Reilly, National Press Club meeting, "Aiming
Before We Shoot: The 'Quiet Revolution' in Environmental Policy" 6 (Sept. 26, 1990) with
COMMONER, supra note 36, at 213-14.
44. CoMMoNER, supra note 36, at 45, 204 (arguing in favor of banning hazardous sub-
stances such as PCB's). See also id. at 191-210 (arguing in favor of government-mandated
"re-direction" of investment and "re-design" of technologies).
45. See, e.g., Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Man-
agement in the Courts, 85 COLUm L. REv. 277, 320-23 (1985) (citing examples of situations
where prohibition of one hazardous substance has increased pollution through substitute
products).
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